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BOOK REVIEWS 
DISCRIMINATION, JOBS, AND POLITICS: THE STRUGGLE FOR 
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY IN THE UNITED STATES 
SINCE THE NEw DEAL, by Paul Burstein, University of Chicago 
Press, 1985, Price: U.S. Cloth $30.00, Paper $12.95 
Reviewed by Anita L. Allen* 
Three sets of inquiries frame sociologist Paul Burstein's study of 
the struggle for equal employment opportunity in the United States 
since the New Deal. The "struggle" about which he writes is the ef­
fort to obtain passage of legislation legitimating demands for equal 
employment opportunity, providing channels for redress of griev­
ances, ending discrimination in the labor market, and increasing the 
income and status of those discriminated against. 1 The passage of the 
Equal Employment Opportunity Acts, Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964 and its 1972 amendments,2 were milestones in that strug­
gle. The 1980's have already become an era of reassessment for Title 
VII and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission it created.3 
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh School of Law. B.A., New College 
1974; Ph.D., University of Michigan, 1979; J.D., Harvard Law School, 1984. 
I. P. BURSTEIN, DISCRIMINATION, JOBS, AND POLITICS: THE STRUGGLE FOR EQUAL EM­
PLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY IN THE UNITED STATES SINCE THE NEW DEAL at 127 (1985). 
2. The Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1964, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000(e) to 2000(e)-(17) (1981), hereinafter referred to as "Title VII," was amended by 
the Equal Employment Act of 1972, Public L. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103. The Amendments broadened 
the enforcement and investigatory powers of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
("EEOC"). 
In broad aspect, Title VII prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex or 
national origin by certain private employers, labor organizations and employment agencies engaged 
in or related to industries affecting interstate commerce. Proscribed conduct includes discriminatory 
hiring, discharge, job classification and referral. Also prohibited are discrimination in the terms, 
compensation, conditions, or privileges of employment, and retaliatory discharges of persons seeking 
relief under the provisions of Title VII. 
Title VII created the EEOC with administrative authority to receive, investigate and resolve 
complaints. It also authorized private persons whose complaints against private employers are not 
resolved by the EEOC to bring an action in federal court. The Attorney General was authorized by 
Title VII to bring actions against employers deemed to have engaged in a pattern or practice of 
discrimination. 
3. Title VII and the EEOC were criticized in 1970's as having had only a limited impact on the 
reduction of labor discrimination. See generally, e.g., Hill, The Equal Employment Opportunity Acts 
227 
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Burstein's attempt to measure and explain the equal employment 
gains of recent decades are thus potentially of practical as well as 
scholarly import. 
Burstein's first set of inquiries concerns the causes and conse­
quences of the passage of equal employment legislation. A second set 
of inquiries relates to the role of the social sciences in sharpening un­
derstanding of legislative processes and democratic politics. A third 
and final set of inquiries relates to the responsiveness of the American 
democratic government to the preferences and concerns of the public. 
Chapter 1 introduces and motivates these three areas of inquiry. 
Chapters 2 through 4 set forth Burstein's account of the origin of Ti­
tle VII and his pivotal conclusion that public opinion was the deter­
minant factor leading to the enactment of Title VII in 1964 and its 
strengthening in 1972. Chapter 5 takes on the competing view that 
"elitist" factors such as elections, lobbying, Congressional leadership 
or presidential pressure were more determinant than public opinion in 
bringing about Title VII. Chapters 6 and 7 report good news on the 
economic consequences of Title VII in the 1970's and project the 
law's long-range impact. Chapter 8 concludes the book with a 
sketchy survey of theories concerning the power of public opinion in 
the modern democratic state. It is suggested that the struggle for 
equal employment legislation is an affirmative lesson about the effi­
cacy of public opinion in shaping governmental policy. 
WHY CoNGRESS ENACTED TITLE VII 
Burstein commences with the claim that methodological devel­
opments in the social sciences make it possible to eschew vague and 
imprecise accounts of Congressional action offered by lawyers and 
others.4 Earlier accounts, he argues, identify a "long list of factors" 
of 1964 and 1972: A Critical Analysis of the Legislative History and Administration of the Law, 2 
INDUS. REL. L.J. I ( 1977). 
Responding to perceived opposition to government enforcement of equal employment laws, the 
U.S. Civil Rights Commission (" C R C") formally recommended in a 1981 Report that the federal 
government seek to "vigorously enforce all laws related to nondiscrimination in employment," alleg­
ing that "despite civil rights laws prohibiting discrimination, there is ample evidence that employ­
ment and promotional opportunities are not available to minorities and women on an equal basis 
with white males." U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, Report to the President and the Congress, 
January 1981 at 14. The C R C  report warned that the unemployment rates of minorities and women, 
compared to white males had risen between 1970 and 1976 and between 1976 and 1979, that women 
and minorities were still excluded from better paying job categories, and that affirmative action 
would be required to effectively combat discrimination. !d. at 14-15. 
4. The methodological developments referred to are uses of statistical and economic methods 
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whose distinct causal roles and interaction in bringing about passage 
of Title VII are not explained. 5 
Towards offering a more precise account, Burstein relies on sys­
tematic, statistical analysis of diverse data. Appropriately, method­
ological arguments accompany each foray beyond standard social 
science resources and traditional uses of United States Bureau of the 
Census and Department of Labor statistics. Hence, this book in­
cludes arguments that bill sponsorship trends are reliable indicators of 
Congressional support for equal employment legislation; that public 
opinion poll responses are reliable indicators of the thrust of public 
opinion on civil rights matters; and that New York Times coverage of 
civil rights and anti-civil rights demonstrations is a reliable indicator 
of the impact of the civil rights movement on the public. 
On the basis of these data, Burstein explains Congressional pas­
sage of Title VII as a complex interplay, "the result of the conjunction 
of three forces-public opinion on EEO [here, and elsewhere, "equal 
employment opportunity"] and civil rights, the civil rights movement, 
and the ideas that led to the drafting of the law in the particular form 
it took."6 However, he singled out what he described as the slow, 
steady growth of public opinion favoring equal employment as the 
"fundamental" determinant behind the initial passage and strengthen-
to systematically analyze and gauge the consequences of "congressional action, public opinion, and 
other relevant social, political and economic phenomena" over time. See P. BuRSTEIN, at 6 and note 
9 (citing examples of the new social science methodology, including E. TUFTE, POLITICAL CONTROL 
OF THE ECONOMY (1978)). 
5. Writers have ascribed a causal role in the passage of Title VII ,  or, to the 1964 Civil Rights 
Act as a whole to some of nearly a dozen different factors. See, e.g., C. WHALEN AND B. WHALEN, 
THE LONGEST DEBATE (1985) (stressing "citizen support"); F. PIVEN AND R. CLOWARD, POOR 
PEOPLE'S MOVEMENTS: WHY THEY SUCCEED, How THEY FAIL (1977) (stressing the role of dem­
onstrations, fear of violence and the civil rights movement). These include public opinion, mass 
demonstrations, fear of violence, the civil rights movement and/or pressure applied by its leadership, 
lobbying by commercial, religious and labor groups, the election of Democrats, the moral concerns 
of individual members of Congress, and the influence of Congressional leaders and the White House. 
6. See P. BURSTEIN, at 94. In THE LONGEST DEBATE, supra note 5, Burstein cites not three 
but five forces as having converged to spawn "citizen support" said to have resulted in the passage of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964. First, black Americans took protests to the streets; second, protests 
were conducted in regions of the country other the South; third, publicized violence against blacks 
aroused public sympathy; fourth, civil rights leaders made effective use of the media; and fifth, civil 
rights leaders successfully cast the pending Civil Rights Act in appealing moral and religious terms. 
See id. at 230-34. 
Although Whalen and Whalen employ journalistic rather than social scientific methods in THE 
LONGEST DEBATE, their conclusion that ''citizen support" was the fundamental cause of passage of 
the 1964 Civil Rights Act is strikingly similar to Burstein's. "Citizen support" appears to approxi­
mate what Burstein means by "public opinion". 
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ing of Title VII. 7 
Burstein argued that what Congress finally enacted, having re­
jected hundreds of equal employment measures throughout the 1940's 
and 1950's,8 was tantamount to long-delayed New Deal legislation. 
The New Deal-rooted inspiration behind Title VII was the notion that 
Congress should invoke the Commerce Clause to intervene in the pri­
vate labor market to end discrimination. 9 Of course, the idea that the 
commerce powers of the federal government authorize imposing non­
discrimination strictures on the private labor sector had its detractors 
both in the 1940's and in the 1960's.10 Moreover, while the concept 
that the federal government could permit implementation of nondis­
crimination policies applicable to private labor gained footing in the 
New Deal, key substantive provisions of Title VII made it considera­
bly more than simply delayed New Deal legislation. Most notably, 
the sex discrimination prohibition of Title VII originated in the Sen­
ate in 1964-not in the New Deal. 1 1  
Burstein convincingly illustrates through analysis of public opin­
ion surveys dating back to the late 1930's and 1940's that there was a 
gradual shift in public sentiment toward equal employment rights for 
blacks and women. However, he falls short of eliminating doubt as to 
the "determinant" cause of Congressional action on equal employ­
ment legislation. It is evident that by 1964 the public favored equal 
employment, at least in the abstract, and that Congressional action to 
secure it in 1964 and 1972 was consistent with what the public fa­
vored. As Burstein summarizes the evidence: 
Congress first passed EEO legislation in 1964 when the proportion of 
the public favoring EEO and the public's intensity of concern had 
7. See P. BURSTEIN, at 95. 
8. Cf Hill, supra note 3, at 2 note 7. 
9. The Commerce Clause, U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, provides that: "The Congress shall have 
Power ... To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the 
Indian Tribes; .. .. " 
10. See, e.g., Ervin, The United States Congress and Civil Rights Legislation, 42 N.C. L. REv. 3, 
7 ( 1963) ("Once we begin using the commerce clause to affect matters that have no rational connec­
tion with the free flow of goods, then we have fatally dropped the bar to governmental tyranny that 
was the purpose of the original framers of the Constitution, who were so careful to construct safe­
guards against an all-encompassing federal government."). 
11. The sex discrimination prohibition was added to H.R. 7152 pursuant to an amendment 
offered by Representative Howard Smith to belittle or stymie passage of what was to become Title 
VII. See C. WHALEN AND B. WHALEN, supra note 5, at 115-17. See also P. BURSTEIN, at 95 
("Before the adoption ofTit1e 7, there was almost no public demand that women be protected by the 
EEO law."). 
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reached historical high points, the proportion of the public covered by 
state EEO laws had just exceeded half for the first time, the proportion of 
the public believing the government was moving too fast on integration 
had fallen to a low point, and a majority of whites in all regions favored 
EEO. 
Congress adopted the 1972 amendments to Title 7 when almost eve­
ryone favored EEO for blacks in principle; two thirds of the public ap­
proved of women's working outside the home, two-thirds of the public 
said they would be more likely to vote for a candidate if he or she favored 
improving opportunities for blacks and women, and relatively few people 
felt intensely concerned about the issue.12 
231 
This is very suggestive but not conclusive evidence that, in the partic­
ular form it emerged from its journey through the House of Repre­
sentatives and then the Senate, Title VII was a response to popular 
opinion. It is still possible that passage of Title VII was precipitated 
by dramatic protests and race confrontations in the South. 
Interestingly, although he defined his task as providing a more 
precise account than others have given of why Congress passed Title 
VII when it did and in the form that it did, Burstein did not focus 
sharply or realistically on the motives of individual Congressmen. He 
did not take evidence of actual motives and what shaped them sys­
tematically into account. No methodological rationale was offered for 
restricting attention to influences on aggregate action rather than the 
motives of individual players. Although the barriers to identification 
of motives are apparent, Charles and Barbara Whalen's journalistic 
account of the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 demonstrates 
that carefully organized factual data can shed light on the complex 
motives of Presidents and members of Congress.13 Failing to take 
such data into account, Burstein's conclusion that public opinion was 
the fundamental determinant of Congressional action-though based 
on the methods and theories of social science-is, after all, imprecise. 
Burstein has not succeeded at precisely and conclusively estab­
lishing public opinion as the "determinant" factor behind passage of 
Title VII, but he has made good use of his data to clarify the roles of 
elections, lobbying, Congressional leadership and the White House.14 
One of Burstein's primary concerns was to establish whether these 
12. Id. at 67. 
13. C. WHALEN AND B. WHALEN, supra note 5. These writers present lush, detailed factual 
data highly suggestive of the motives of individual Congressmen, but without an overt methodologi­
cal rationale for doing so. 
14. See generally P. BURSTEIN, at Chapter 5. 
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"elitist" factors rather than public opinion were the fundamental 
causes of Title VII's enactment. His analysis of the evidence argues 
that they were not. 
The role played by Congressional leaders in the years before pas­
sage was as the "organizers of the congressional response to public 
opinion rather than as actors powerful in their own right."15 Nor did 
Presidents greatly influence Congressional support for equal employ­
ment legislation, so far as Burstein could gauge.16 Lobbying appears 
to have had little effect, other than to have helped to communicate 
trends in public opinion. Lobbying did not get Congress to act in 
opposition to the desires of the public.17 
Surprisingly, support for equal employment legislation appears 
to have correlated little with the numerical strength of the Demo­
cratic party in Congress. Prior to 1964, sponsors of equal employ­
ment legislation were not more likely to be Democrats than 
Republicans.18 They were likely to be junior members of Congress, 
particularly sensitive to trends in public opinion because they could 
not be confident of retaining their seats.19 Not until the late 1960's, in 
time for the move to strengthen Title VII with enforcement provi­
sions, had civil rights become a Democratic party cause. 20 
TITLE VII's CoNSEQUENCES: GooD NEws 
What effects have Title VII's prohibitions21 against discrimina­
tion had on the economic status of its intended beneficiaries? Have 
the relative employment gains of minorities and women attributable 
to equal employment legislation been negligible as some critics claim? 
Toward providing answers to these questions Burstein drew on formal 
economic models, but interpreted data from a viewpoint intended to 
take fully into account the political implications of the passage of leg­
islation, the effect of social change on the struggle for equal employ­
ment opportunity, and the implication of equal employment 
15. See P. BURSTEIN, at 122. 
16. See id. at 115 ("Presidents Truman, Johnson, and Nixon publicly favored passing or 
strengthening EEO legislation, whereas Roosevelt and Kennedy were neutral and Eisenhower was 
opposed . . . . Overall ,  the correlation between presidential support for EEO and Congressional 
sponsorship was [a low) .42." [footnote omitted}). 
17. See id. at 122. 
18. See id. at 100-01. 
19. See id. at iOl. 
20. See id. 
21. See supra note 2. 
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opportunity for the economic status of social groups. Burstein con­
cluded that, while women and minorities have not achieved parity 
with white males, they have made significant economic gains and in­
curred no measurable losses.22 
This claim is bound to spark controversy. Today, equal employ­
ment legislation is being blamed for a panoply of social and economic 
ills. As Burstein points out, it is said to have divided Americans by 
race and national origin into groups entitled to special privileges, de­
stroyed the autonomy of local government, and assaulted basic no­
tions of individual worth and merit.23 Moreover, economic studies 
making use of the methods and statistical techniques of contemporary 
social science have concluded that ( 1) the income gains of non-white 
men since World War II must be attributed to gains in productivity 
rather than to equal employment opportunity policies and (2) wo­
men's income has made only modest gains attributable to equal em­
ployment legislation. 24 
Burstein's study attacked these conclusions and offered strikingly 
different ones. He depicted the economic status of women and minor­
ities as a function of at least four variables: relative productivity, dis­
criminatory attitudes or other measures of the social context, the 
demand for labor in the economy and the enforcement of equal em­
ployment opportunity legislation. Examining the impact of these 
variables Burstein concluded that equal employment opportunity ex­
penditures and court victories have had a significant positive effect on 
the earnings, income and group shares of women and minorities.25 
Burstein concluded that neither women nor non-white men have suf­
fered losses attributable to equal employment legislation. Moreover, 
22. SeeP. BURSTEIN, at 150-51. 
23. See id. at 125. It is ironic that equal employment legislation is blamed, if only on the basis 
of impressionistic and anecdotal evidence, for racial divisiveness and impaired self-esteem-some of 
the very social ills it was designed to cure. 
24. See id. at 125-26. 
25. "Group share" in this context is "a measure of the proportion of total income going to each 
of the four relevant groups-white men, non-white men, white-women, and non-white women­
relative to each group's proportion of the total population, taking into account individuals old enough 
to be in the labor force, regardless of whether they were working or had income." !d. at 134. Utiliz­
ing the proportionate "group share" measure and focusing on the years 1948-1978, Burstein con­
cluded that the economic status of non-white men and non-white women have shown an upward 
trend since 1948, and especially since equal employment legislation was passed and went into effect 
in the mid-1960's. 
White women's median earnings as a percentage of white males registered a distinct decline 
during the same period, falling steadily through the early 1970's, reaching their lowest level in 1973 
before slightly rising by 1978. See id. at 136-38. However, while white women's relative total in-
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there is no evidence that one group has gained at the expense of an­
other.26 Non-white women have been the biggest winners, having 
reaped the benefits of new found employment and educational 
opportunities. 27 
PUBLIC OPINION, DEMOCRACY AND LEGISLATION 
Burstein wraps up his study posing a great many methodological 
questions and pondering the implications for democratic politics of 
his finding that public opinion was the driving force behind passage of 
Title VII. Does this finding, he asks, vindicate the pluralist vision of 
American democratic government? Is the history of the struggle for 
equal employment an object lesson about the extent to which demo­
cratic politics can be successfully used to redistribute rights, opportu­
nities, and income in society? 
Questions like these about the power of the public to direct gov­
ernmental activity have been raised before in connection with the 
struggle for equal employment.28 However, Burstein may be among 
the first to systematically employ empirical data to buttress a tentative 
majoritarian optimism. 29 That optimism is warranted, he suggests, 
because recent studies30 of the economy, war and civil rights have 
shown that the government is frequently responsive to public opinion. 
The struggle for equal employment was an occasion when the formal 
and informal institutions of democratic government played a signifi-
comes as a percentage of white men's declined through the early 1960's, the downward trend re­
versed about the time equal employment opportunity legislation was passed. See id. 
Burstein concludes that the effect of equal employment on white women has been variable and 
less predictable than its effect on non-whites. Women's mixed victory may relate, the author sug­
gests, to there being less than universal acceptance of women working outside the home and having 
the same rights as men in the labor force. See id. at 150-52. 
Burstein's findings conflict with some of those reached by equal employment supporters who 
believe Title VII has had little or no impact on improving the economic status of minorities and 
women. See, e.g., U.S. Commission on Civil Rights supra note 3. 
26. See P. BURSTEIN, at 151-52. 
27. SeeP. BURSTEIN, at 147, 150. 
28. See, e.g., Blumrosen, The Crossroads for Equal Employment Opportunity: Incisive Adminis­
tration or Indecisive Bureaucracy?, 49 NOTRE DAME LAW. 46, 62 (1973 ) ("The unresolved question 
for our time is whether we are able to direct governmental activity, or whether it will, from forces 
which we imperfectly understand, drift in such a way as to magnify our social tragedy."). 
29. P. BURSTEIN, at 188, 199 ("Democratic politics has not ended discrimination or produced 
equality; but has increased the opportunities available to millions of people and helped insure they 
would be fairly treated."). 
30. !d. at 190. 
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cant role in getting the federal government to reallocate econom1c 
rights. 
Burstein concludes that his finding that public opinion was the 
driving force behind passage of equal employment legislation "is quite 
compatible with the pluralist view, but not with the elitist view."31 At 
the same time he recognizes that "pluralists," represented by Robert 
Dahl in Pluralist Democracy in the United States (1967), and "elit­
ists," represented by William Gamson, share the core belief that the 
government is responsive to public opinion, but that its response is 
limited. 32 The differences between "pluralist" and "elitist" lie in the 
accounts they give of how much and why governmental response to 
public opinion is limited. As Burstein rightly points out, claims that 
the process of legislation is "elitist" or "pluralist" are ultimately too 
vague to be proven or disproven. But this does not close the door on a 
concern for better understanding of the efficacy of public opinion in 
the timing and shaping of legislation. 
SOME LIMITATIONS 
There are more readable accounts of the passage of Title VII 
than this one, 33 although Burstein's obvious commitment to the ideal 
of equal employment and faith in democratic institutions add a mea­
sure of humanistic vitality to a highly quantitative presentation. 
There are also accounts that more closely and critically examine spe­
cific provisions of Title VII and the activity of the EEOC. 34 Very 
little substantive analysis of case law developments, original or other­
wise, is contained in this book. 
These features will lessen the utility of the book to legal scholars. 
On the other hand, Burstein's work makes a unique contribution. 
Analyses tracing public and Congressional support for equal employ­
ment principles and legislation over a forty-year period are not to be 
found elsewhere. His tally of Title VII cases whose decisions favor 
women and minorities and his judgments about their influence should 
be of interest to labor and civil rights lawyers. 
Burstein himself directs readers to some of the major limitations 
of his study. 35 One of these is reliance on pre-1980 data, even though 
31. !d. at 187-89. 
32. !d. at 189. 
33. See, e.g., C. WHALEN AND B. WHALEN, supra note 5. 
34. See, e.g., Hill, supra note 3. 
35. SeeP. BURSTEIN, at (Preface) x and 11-12. 
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consideration of later data would clearly have been appropriate.36 
Another limitation Burstein notes is that his study focuses only on 
blacks and women. It offers little direct insight into efforts to achieve 
equal employment opportunity for Hispanics, Native Americans or 
other minority groups. 
Burstein is careful to point out that the struggle for equal em­
ployment opportunity and the struggle for passage of Title VII of the 
1964 Civil Rights Act are not identical. Nevertheless, a further limi­
tation of his account is his thin treatment of efforts to obtain equal 
employment prior to 1964 through state legislation, the civil rights 
movement, President Roosevelt's Executive Order 8802 (which pro­
hibited discrimination by the federal government and defense contrac­
tors) and the Fair Employment Practices Committee. 
A final limitation stems from the attempt to account for the pas­
sage of Title VII in isolation from the other titles of the 1964 Civil 
Rights Act. Burstein argues that although Title VII obtained passage 
as part of a larger act dealing with voting rights, public accommoda­
tions and education, the struggle for equal employment opportunity 
has a history of its own meriting independent study. Indeed, to a 
large extent, the struggle for equal employment does have a history of 
its own.37 Nevertheless, Title VII was part of a package of civil rights 
reforms simultaneously ushered through Congress. It is impossible to 
explain with exactitude why Title VII was enacted when it was and 
says what it says without substantial consideration of factors such as 
the perceived urgency of the civil rights concerns embodied in other 
titles of the 1964 Act. 
Despite these limitations, Burstein's study possesses considerable 
36. Failure to consider more current trends is attributed to delays in publication of his book. 
37. Once civil rights deficiencies in labor, housing, education, voting and public accommoda­
tions were unified for redress in pending legislation, their histories became, for some purposes, inex­
tricable. The partial extricability of their histories is well-illustrated, however, by the 1959 Report of 
the US Commission on Civil Rights . The general purpose of the Report was to transmit findings of 
an investigation into voting practices, public education, and housing to determine the extent to 
which the equal protection guarantees of the 14th Amendment were being abridged in and by the 
states. Whatever its members' views on private employment discrimination may have been, the 
Commission was not authorized to investigate allegations of labor-related discrimination. This 
meant proponents of equal employment were compelled to continue separately pursuing alternative 
means of bringing employment discrimination to the attention of Congress and the President. Oppo­
sition to federal government intervention in the private labor field appears to have been more viru­
lent than opposition to intervention in other civil rights fields. This may explain why the 
rudimentary Title VII in the original Civil Rights bill sent to the House of Representatives by Presi­
dent Kennedy addressed equal employment but merely permitted the President to establish a com­
mission to curb the discriminatory practices of firms having government contracts. 
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strengths. Chief among them is an inventive use of empirical data and 
politically sensitive analysis of that data to challenge leading theories 
and conventional assumptions about the efficacy and future of equal 
employment legislation. 
